Combating Disinformation with AI: Epistemic and Ethical Challenges by Lange, Benjamin & Lechterman, Ted
Combating disinformation with AI: 
Epistemic and ethical challenges 
Benjamin Lange 
Faculty of Philosophy 
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich 
Munich, Germany 
benjamin.lange@lrz.uni-muenchen.de 
Theodore M. Lechterman 
Institute for Ethics in AI 
University of Oxford 
Oxford, UK 
theodore.lechterman@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Abstract—AI-supported methods for identifying and combat-
ing disinformation are progressing in their development and ap-
plication. However, these methods face a litany of epistemic and 
ethical challenges. These include (1) robustly defining disinfor-
mation, (2) reliably classifying data according to this definition, 
and (3) navigating ethical risks in the deployment of countermeas-
ures, which involve a mixture of harms and benefits. This paper 
seeks to expose and offer preliminary analysis of these challenges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The spread of disinformation on online media and commu-
nication channels presents an increasingly serious global prob-
lem. Disinformation campaigns have already catalyzed geno-
cides, lynchings, insurrections, pandemics, and suicides, as 
well as economic destruction and reputational damage [16][6] 
[9][2]. 
Concern about the ongoing threat of disinformation 
has spawned various initiatives designed to combat it by 
govern-ments, firms, NGOs, journalists, and researchers. 
These initia-tives increasingly draw on artificial intelligence to 
detect disin-formation and facilitate the deployment of 
countermeasures. AI-based tools include ActiveFence, 
Blackbird AI, BotSentinel, ClaimBuster, Cyabra, and 
Graphika, among others. But efforts to identify and combat 
disinformation face a litany of epistemic and ethical 
challenges. These include (1) robustly defining dis-
information, (2) reliably classifying data according to this defi-
nition, and (3) navigating ethical risks in the deployment 
of countermeasures, which involve a mixture of harms and 
bene-fits. This paper seeks to expose and offer preliminary 
analysis of these challenges. 
In what follows, we offer an initial philosophical analysis 
of the risks involved in combating disinformation with AI-
assisted tools. We focus on identifying significant ethical 
risks, under-stood, for simplicity, as a function of the 
magnitude of a harm multiplied by its prevalence and 
likelihood. We follow the con-ventional definition of “harm” 
in moral and legal philosophy as the setback of interests [13]. 
Significant ethical risks therefore can involve subjecting many 
people to major harms, many peo-ple to minor harms, or few 
people to major harms.  
Much neighboring scholarship on these issues 
specifically addresses the ethics of content moderation on 
social media plat-forms, with primary attention to the 
responsibilities of platform hosts [19][20]. Our approach 
differs in two main ways. First, our 
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focus is on the phenomenon of disinformation itself and not par-
ticular channels of transmission, which raise many more specific 
issues. Second, although our account certainly has implications 
for the responsibilities of channel owners and managers, they are 
not our primary targets. As opportunities for disinformation de-
tection and counteraction become more widely available to gov-
ernments, firms, and NGOs, we seek to expose and analyze ep-
istemic and ethical challenges that pertain to any party engaged 
in advanced practices of disinformation detection or counterac-
tion. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II notes the im-
portance of a robust definition of disinformation and evaluates 
three candidate definitions. Section III discusses the ethical risks 
associated with diagnosing disinformation once a definition is 
adopted. Section IV then turns to the potential ethical risks re-
lated to counteraction measures. Section V concludes with a dis-
cussion of issues for further research. 
II. DEFINING DISINFORMATION
To effectively identify and combat disinformation, AI-based 
approaches need to be based on a sound definition of disinfor-
mation and operationalizable for the desired deployment con-
text. We propose that a candidate definition should meet the fol-
lowing two related desiderata: 
Accuracy: The definition needs to be as conceptually sound 
and exhaustive as possible. 
Operationalizability: The definition needs to be practically 
applicable by enabling observers to distinguish disinfor-
mation with available resources and at tolerable cost. 
The first desideratum seeks to ensure that the candidate def-
inition classifies instances of disinformation in a way that can 
maximally justify and explain observers’ considered judgments 
[24]. A conceptually sound definition will precisely distinguish 
disinformation from neighboring concepts, including misinfor-
mation, information, parody, and satire. Despite the obvious 
value of a conceptually sound definition, we note a potential 
tradeoff between conceptual accuracy and operationalizability 
in practical contexts. We think it infeasible to endorse a defini-
tion of disinformation that is impossible to apply in practice be-
cause, for example, it relies on criteria that cannot be meaning-
fully assessed by external observers. Conversely, employing a 
practical definition that is very easy to apply may come at the 
cost of its accuracy. Successfully combating disinformation in 
practice is hence subject to an inherent tension between concep-
tual and practical considerations that may in turn amplify epis-
temic and ethical risks. 
A. Three Definitions of Disinformation
We examine three possible definitions of disinformation in
light of the suggested desiderata. The first contender is the so-
called 
Intention Definition: Disinformation is misleading infor-
mation that is intended to cause harm [15][12, p. 260]. 
“Misleading information” in this definition refers to information 
that has a “propensity to cause false beliefs” [15, 12: p. 260]. 
This definition characterizes disinformation by focusing on the 
quality of the will behind it. This means that it covers ineffectual 
disinformation scenarios: disinformation that fails to cause harm 
even though it was intended to do so. As we discuss further be-
low, the ability to assess intent is an important criterion for jus-
tifying countermeasures with a punitive dimension. 
This definition is endorsed by several experts [18]. However, 
one challenge with this definition lies in uncovering the inten-
tions of a disinformation outbreak when the originator of the dis-
information is unclear. Even when the originators are identifia-
ble, observers may have limited access to their mental states, 
which will often inhibit efforts to ascribe intentionality in a 
meaningful way. During a pandemic, for instance, people may 
concoct or promulgate various misleading claims about the ori-
gins or treatment of a disease without having malicious inten-
tions. While some may indeed have ulterior motives, the basis 
for these motives may not always be obvious. 
In recognition of these challenges, a second candidate defi-
nition is the so-called  
Harm Definition: Disinformation is misleading information 
that causes or risks causing systematic harm to some agent 
for the benefit of another [5, p. 80]. 
This definition characterizes disinformation in a way that fo-
cuses on the likelihood that the misleading information will lead 
to bad outcomes for a victim (regardless of the intentions that 
may lie behind it). As before, misleading information refers to 
information that has a propensity to cause false beliefs. 
While intentions are implicitly characterized in this defini-
tion insofar as the disinformation (expectedly) benefits some-
one, it avoids “intention” terminology and speaks only of harms 
and benefits, which may be easier to measure in practice. This 
definition also captures the possibility that disinformation can 
be spread without malicious intent, such as when people simply 
share harmful and misleading content posted by others.  
One challenge this definition faces is capturing ineffectual 
disinformation: disinformation that fails to harm a victim even 
though it was intended to do so. Even if a malicious disinfor-
mation campaign intended to harm someone but, for some rea-
son, no harm manifests, identifying and combating the campaign 
may still be warranted. 
The last contender is the 
Hybrid Definition: Disinformation is misleading infor-
mation that either (a) intends to harm or (b) systematically 
harms or risks harming someone [14]. 
This hybrid definition is a combination of the previous two def-
initions and characterizes all cases of disinformation as either 
intending to harm or de facto harming. It thereby covers both the 
input and output dimensions of disinformation. This definition 
also excludes other categories of misinformation, such as parody 
and satire, if and when they are neither intended to cause harm 
or likely to do so. However, the definition would indeed classify 
instances of parody and satire as disinformation where such in-
stances are significantly harmful in intent or effect. 
This definition is the most exhaustive. It covers ineffectual, 
malicious, and inadvertent promulgated untruths. This best mit-
igates the risk of failing to classify some misleading information 
as disinformation. However, this definition might be harder to 
operationalize than the previous two, since a heuristic aimed at 
filtering for disinformation would have to focus on all of the key 
variables contained in the previous two definitions. If resources 
for data gathering and analysis are scarce, the additional explan-
atory power of this definition may come at some costs. 
B. Assessment of Definitions of Disinformation
The Hybrid Definition is the most conceptually sound of the
definitions we have considered because it avoids all intuitively 
problematic cases of misclassification. However, this definition 
needs to operationalize both harms and intentions. A tradeoff 
thus exists between conceptual soundness and operationalizabil-
ity. Moreover, the definition needs to rely on a measure of in-
tentions that is distinct from its measure of harms. Insofar as 
such a measure cannot be deployed, employing the Hybrid Def-
inition may be futile.  
The Harm Definition will be sufficient if the primary tactics 
to be deployed do not involve punitive measures. If the goal is 
merely to correct the public record through public service an-
nouncements, a disinformation mitigation campaign has no need 
to trace the intentions of those who have distorted the public un-
derstanding of an issue. Confirming the intentions behind an ac-
tion, however, is generally an important criterion for justifying 
punitive responses to it. If a disinformation mitigation campaign 
wishes to neutralize or deter individuals who spread false 
claims, it must be able to distinguish culpable from innocent dis-
information spreading, which generally requires knowledge of 
intentions. We return to this idea in Section IV. 
III. DIAGNOSING DISINFORMATION
Once a robust definition of disinformation has been chosen, 
the next step is to operationalize that definition for detecting in-
stances of disinformation. Here is where AI offers numerous po-
tential advantages. For instance, natural language processing can 
be used to summarize text, identify the author’s ideological 
stance, and assess whether content exhibits manipulative rheto-
ric [21]. AI can detect doctored content (i.e., “deepfakes”) by 
analyzing abnormal features of a subject’s physiology, scanning 
for technical traces of content editing, or using deep neural net-
works to separate authentic from inauthentic content on the basis 
of numerous parameters [22]. AI can be used to detect fake users 
(“bots”), which are frequently implicated in the spread of disin-
formation [23]. None of these methods on its own is sufficient 
for detecting disinformation according to the definition we pro-
pose, as none includes an assessment of harm. However, these 
and related methods provide enhanced capabilities for broader 
disinformation detection efforts. They are also implicated in the 
ethical risks that follow.  
Two main risks in disinformation detection are producing 
false positives and false negatives.  
False positives: False positives occur when diagnosing ma-
terial as disinformation that is not in fact disinformation. 
False negatives: False negatives occur when incorrectly 
classifying disinformation content as legitimate infor-
mation. 
False positives can entail subjecting falsely-identified spreaders 
to harmful countermeasures. False negatives risk allowing 
harmful untruths to continue spreading undetected. Both fail-
ures, when publicly revealed, can undermine the credibility of 
disinformation detectors and set back progress on efforts to re-
duce the spread of disinformation.  
Both risks become drastically more likely when the defini-
tion of disinformation is itself problematic. Thus, one of the 
main challenges for AI-based approaches to combating disinfor-
mation is to make their conceptualization of disinformation as 
watertight as possible. 
Further problems occur when attempting to operationalize a 
strong definition with available tools. For instance, an intention-
based definition may be hard to apply, as observers have limited 
insight into actors’ mental states. Proxies may be insufficiently 
reliable. A harm-based definition requires speculation about the 
potential magnitude of harm and the urgency of intervening, not 
to mention further choices about specifications of harm and ur-
gency. Often, harm magnitude and urgency of intervention only 
become clear after the fact. 
Even when these challenges have been overcome, disinfor-
mation detectors face additional challenges of determining 
whether a given piece of information fits the disinformation def-
inition. These challenges include lack of verifiable data, highly 
judgment-sensitive topics, topics where there is significant ex-
pert disagreement, and situations where information is dynami-
cally evolving. The COVID-19 pandemic exhibits several of 
these features at once, which helps to explain why researchers 
have struggled to develop accurate models for detecting pan-
demic-related disinformation [17]. 
Disinformation detection systems may also be biased in cer-
tain ways. They may be biased toward certain ideological posi-
tions or scientific theories. They may be compromised by con-
flicts of interest between different stakeholders. Human agents 
may fall prey to automation bias by trusting too readily in as-
sessments offered by AI systems [25]. And the AI components 
may be biased themselves. For instance, if these systems draw 
on natural language processing, they may treat certain commu-
nities’ linguistic conventions as the norm for truth-telling and 
misclassify messages that rely on alternative linguistic conven-
tions from marginalized communities [26]. 
IV. COUNTERACTING DISINFORMATION
Efforts to combat suspected disinformation will naturally in-
herit and compound any limitations of defining or diagnosing 
information as disinformation. But the deployment of mitigation 
measures also introduces further ethical risks. As discussed pres-
ently, these include risks in inoculating victims and debunking 
false content, risks in neutralizing the source of disinformation, 
and risks involving the political legitimacy of different partici-
pants in information warfare. The discussion that follows is 
largely speculative, as many of the risks we foresee have not 
been extensively studied or documented. It also focuses on tar-
geted post-hoc interventions, in contrast to more general efforts 
to promote media literacy [29], which contain fewer risks of 
harm. 
A. Debunking and Inoculation
The most obvious tactic a disinformation combatant may
wish to use is broadcasting what it believes to be the truth of the 
matter—to “set the record straight.” This can backfire, obvi-
ously, if the combatant is in the grip of false beliefs. The com-
batant may have incomplete information. The information may 
be in flux. Current expert consensus may be subsequently dis-
proven. The combatant may have access to the relevant facts but 
misinterpret their significance. And so on. These challenges are 
evident from the COVID-19 pandemic response, during which 
many experts initially rejected calls for face masks and warned 
of transmission via contact with contaminated surfaces, only to 
walk back these positions later [7].  
Attempts to set the record straight can also backfire if the 
combatant possesses the truth but fails to explain it in a way that 
people fully understand and appreciate. Climate change commu-
nication provides a cautionary tale. Numerous studies have sug-
gested that a contributor to climate change skepticism is a sys-
tematic misunderstanding of what uncertainty means in scien-
tific research, where few claims are ever definitively proven [4]. 
These studies have spurred the scientific community to reex-
amine how to communicate effectively to the public.  
One variant of broadcast counter-messaging is content label-
ing on social media, where a platform attaches a label to posts 
containing sensitive content. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 
for instance, Facebook automatically applied a label to any post 
that mentioned the topic of vaccines [1]. The label contained a 
link to official information sources. Although this approach gen-
erally avoids the difficulty of adjudicating the complexities of 
the debate, one challenge with Facebook’s approach is that it 
also casts doubt on posts that contained no questionable content. 
Raising doubts about legitimate posts may be counterproductive 
to the larger aims of content moderation. It is also a potentially 
objectionable restriction on expressive liberty.  
In addition to broadcasting the truth, combating disinfor-
mation can involve selective inoculation of disinformation vic-
tims [30]. A combatant might directly communicate with seg-
ments of a population believed to be particularly susceptible to 
deceptive messages or likely to suffer most from false beliefs 
about a given topic. In a pandemic, this might be health care 
workers and medically vulnerable groups, such as residents of 
assisted living facilities. Here, there may be risks of discrimina-
tion and condescension, or the appearance thereof. Those who 
are targeted for disinformation inoculation may wonder why 
they have been targeted, and they may infer that targeting results 
from a judgment of their cognitive inferiority. How the message 
is conveyed can also make a difference. A condescending 
tone—by, for instance, overstating the obvious, ridiculing, or 
admonishing—may insult recipients’ intelligence or dignity.  
Combatants may be tempted to deploy insidious or manipu-
lative tactics, such as subliminal advertising or secretly employ-
ing influential personalities to promulgate certain talking points, 
as Minneapolis attempted to do during the trial of the murder of 
George Floyd [8]. Tactics that bypass human reasoning threaten 
the value of autonomy, as they indicate disrespect for their tar-
gets’ rational agency [27, pp. 90, 2]. As the Minneapolis 
case shows, such tactics are also likely to provoke backlash 
when they are discovered, which can cause irreparable harm to 
com-batants’ credibility. 
B. Neutralizing Sources and Spreaders
Perhaps the most significant ethical risks in disinformation
mitigation involve attempts to neutralize disinformation propa-
gators, i.e., those who disseminate misleading information with 
harmful intentions or effects. Neutralization techniques may in-
volve attempts to identify and publicly expose these individuals 
and groups, subjecting them to public censure and sanctions. 
Neutralization techniques may involve pressing charges with 
law enforcement and/or seeking to have social media accounts 
or content removed. Or, they may involve measures to disrupt 
communication directly through hacking or cyberattacks.  
The kinds of aggressive tactics discussed above carry partic-
ular risks. Many of these are associated with the use of force and 
well handled with the ius in bello principles from just war the-
ory, which provide well-established guidelines for combat activ-
ities [3, 12]. Chief among the risks of aggressive tactics is target 
misidentification. If the combatant mistakenly identifies some-
one as a disinformation propagator and subjects them to harsh 
treatment, the combatant has subjected an innocent person to po-
tentially serious harm. Collateral damage represents a second 
major concern. That is, even if the combatant has accurately 
identified the guilty parties, the countermeasures deployed may 
involve harming other innocent people. Attempts to expose the 
suspects or disrupt their communications channels may result in 
unintended harms to the suspects’ family, colleagues, or neigh-
bors, or to others who use the channels for legitimate purposes. 
Related to this is the risk of disproportionality, that the tactics 
chosen may accomplish their intended goal but do so with ex-
cessive damage to the suspected individual. An attempt to pub-
licly shame a suspected disinformation propagator may create 
opportunities for others to make violent threats, vandalize their 
property, or worse.  
Culpability makes a difference to the justification of coun-
termeasures. An individual or group that willfully creates or pro-
motes disinformation may be culpable in ways that those who 
innocently share disinformation content may not be. Some per-
petrators may be willful but lack components of moral responsi-
bility due to reasons of age or cognitive condition. While certain 
neutralization measures may be warranted regardless of culpa-
bility if the associated harms are severe enough, punitive 
measures may be entirely unjustified for excusable wrongdoing 
[28]. The fact that it may often be difficult to determine whether 
the suspects are culpable creates additional grounds for caution. 
Twitter’s approach to disinformation during the 2020 U.S. 
election presents an interesting combination of targeted inocula-
tion and neutralization elements. Twitter sought to combat dis-
information by labeling posts that it deemed to contain false or 
misleading claims and limiting options for commenting and re-
tweeting [10]. The accuracy of these methods is not clear. How-
ever, one challenge with this approach is that it can be counter-
productive for certain users. For those who believe Twitter is 
ideologically biased against their side, Twitter’s content labels 
may simply reinforce beliefs in the credibility of that content. 
Another risk, of course, is that this method may drive aggrieved 
users toward less regulated channels, where disinformation can 
proliferate more freely. These are merely some of the risks that 
must be balanced against the overall reduction in the spread of 
disinformation that such a method may achieve. 
V. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
Specific issues arise depending on whether the combatant or 
the suspected disinformation propagator is a state or non-state 
entity. If the combatant is a non-state entity acting on its own 
accord, it risks charges of vigilantism and extrajudicial punish-
ment if it seeks to apply sanctions to suspected disinformation 
propagators. The state is the default authority for law enforce-
ment and criminal punishment, and while private actors may be 
justified in acting in certain cases, these decisions require excep-
tional justification. One potential justification is that the combat-
ant owns the channel on which disinformation is flowing. In 
such cases, the combatant would be justified in creating or en-
forcing terms of service to limit disinformation. Without terms 
of service, however, depriving users of the service may consti-
tute an arbitrary breach of contract. And in neither case would a 
channel owner be justified in taking additional punitive 
measures beyond removing content or limiting access. 
If the state is the combatant in question, worries may arise 
over state silencing of speech and the protection of expressive 
liberty. Governments are generally under a stronger duty than 
private entities to tolerate offensive or misleading speech, given 
the state’s coercive power and the importance of expressive lib-
erty to government accountability.  
Conditions change when the disinformation propagator is it-
self a state entity. When this is an agent of a democratic state, 
the normal recourse is to expose and prosecute this behavior 
publicly, rather than engage in surreptitious countermeasures. 
When this is an agent of a foreign state, engaging in information 
warfare with a foreign adversary is generally a prerogative of 
national militaries and counterintelligence services and not ap-
propriate for private organizations. State defense forces may 
choose to engage in information warfare with a foreign adver-
sary and also to employ private contractors in these efforts. In 
both cases, these decisions are subject to the law and ethics of 
warfare. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to provide a preliminary analysis of 
epistemic and ethical challenges of combating disinformation 
with AI. Although we have focused on significant risks, pre-
cisely which risks apply depends on the particular focus and 
methods of a mitigation campaign. Tools that merely provide 
fact-checking services do not face the risks inherent in efforts to 
neutralize disinformation at its source. However, such services 
will indeed face definitional and diagnostic risks. And any sec-
ondary efforts to use these tools for debunking or neutralization 
will of course encounter the risks we have identified in these ar-
eas. 
 Our analysis has focused selectively on significant ethical 
risks in different stages of disinformation mitigation. We have 
not attempted a comprehensive analysis of all pertinent ethical 
risks, nor have we attempted to identify the risks specific to any 
particular method or approach to AI-driven disinformation mit-
igation. Additionally, our intention has been to identify and de-
scribe key ethical risks rather than to defend particular principles 
for balancing or resolving them. Despite these limitations, we 
believe the initial analysis offered here can provide firm founda-
tions for future work on this topic. 
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